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Abstract: This study analyzes the effect of business group membership on cash holding pattern of  
affiliated firms listed at Pak istan Stock Exchange from 2009-2014. Group affiliation can increase 
benefits for affiliated firms by providing an access to internal capital markets, particularly in emerging 
economies where institutional control is weak  and access to external financing is difficult and 
expensive. Using panel data of public limited group affiliated firms and comparable standalone firms, 
the empirical results show that group firms hold less cash than standalone firms.   The results are in 
line with the view that access to internal capital markets enables group affiliated firms to manage their 
operations with low cash reserves.  
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1. Introduction 
     Cash holding is an important measure for households and firms.  Investors, analysts, and firms pay 
much attention to firm’s cash holdings; it determines the liquidity position of a firm. Firms should hold 
an optimal cash for several reasons, looking back at Keynes (1936), he proposed three basic reasons 
for cash holdings, (i) transaction motive, need for managing everyday transactions, (ii) precautionary  
motive, money is needed to cover unexpected future events, (iii) speculative motive, money is held to 
catch any attractive investment opportunity.   
     The literature suggests two conflicting explanations of how business group’s affiliation affects 
corporate cash holdings. First, the existence of internal capital markets and due to lower financial 
constraints group affiliated firms favor to keep lower cash reserves (Schiantarelli and Sembenelli,  
2000). Chang & Hong (2000) found that group reputation and intra-group guarantees support the 
access to external funds. Second, the prevailing view in corporate finance is based on the availability 
of free cash flows, due to agency problems; firms prefer to keep excess cash but at the expense of 
shareholders (Jensen, 1986).  Resultantly, the complex organizational and ownership structure of 
business groups have a higher level of information asymmetry as compare to standalone firms, which 
in turn intensifies the agency conflicts between shareholders and managers. Therefore, the net 
outcome of group affiliation on cash reserves count on which aspect of group dominates the other.  In 
relation to corporate cash holdings, group affiliated firms have better opportunities to approach 
external funds both from inside and outside of the group, and this makes them less financial 
constrained as compare to standalone firms.  
     The economy of Pakistan presents an ideal setting for current study, there are four appealing 
reasons. First, groups cover the major part of the economy in the private sector and have an 
advantage for overall economic development and political landscapes (Saeed et al., 2015). Second,  
group member firms are affiliated with one group, thus deciding about group affiliation is easier and 
clear. Third, many business groups migrated from India and are operating since the independence of 
Pakistan 1947. Fourth, owners of business groups are parliamentarians and playing a key role in 
planning and designing of economic policies. A business group is defined as a set of legally  
independent firms bound together by some formal and informal ties (Khanna & Yafeh, 2005). Gertner 
et al., (1994) and Stein (1997) documents in case of bankruptcy of fellow affiliate the other affiliates  
maintained their independence and limited liability features.   
     The aim of the study to examine the effect of group affiliation on firm’s cash holdings while 
comparing with standalone firms. The main findings suggest by using the panel data of 243Pakistani 
non-financial public limited firms, it is observed that group member firms hold considerably less cash 
as compare to standalone firms. All of the control variables significantly explain firms’ cash levels. 
Overall, findings of the study suggest that presence of internal capital markets and lower level 
financial constraints are encouraging motivators for group member firms to hold less cash.  
     The reminder of this paper is arranged as follows: Section 2 describes theoretical framework and 
hypothesis development. Section 3 discusses data and methodology.  Section 4 contains results. 
5.Conclusion.  
2. Theoretical framework and hypothesis development 
     Business groups are an important business form that is prevailing in many emerging economies as 
well as developed market. But the performance comparison results are different in different  
economies in relation to standalone firms e.g. in India, Chile, Korea and Turkey group affiliation 
improves performance for member firms but in contrary Japanese standalone firms outperform group 
companies.  In emerging economies, most of the literature is available with reference to Khanna and 
Rivkin (2001) and Khanna and Palepu (2000a, b) relied on the notion that groups are widely available 
in countries with weak institutional control (Granovetter, 2005) and imperfect market conditions. 
Several studies have examined the business groups by recognizing different theoretical perspectives 
such as resource-based view (Guillen, 2000), exchange theory (Kiester, 2001), institutional voids  
theory (Khanna & Palepu, 1997), transaction cost theory (Hoskisson et al. 2005),  agency theory  
(Claessens et al., 2000) and risk sharing theory (Khanna & Yafeh, 2005). Studies have explored the 
effect of business groups in Pakistan by considering a limited number of different indicators like 
financial constraints (Saeed and Sameer, 2015), financial performance (Ghani et al., 2011) and 
political connections (Saeed et al., 2015).  A limited research evidence of business groups’ studies is 
available in Pakistan.  
     Knowing that perfect capital markets do not have transaction cost, this is the assumption of perfect 
capital markets that the cost of internal and external funds are equal and firms can easily access to 
their financing needs or to meet cash deficit. In this case, firms should not hold significant cash. But in 
contrary, capital markets are imperfect, given asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders. 
It depends on the characteristics of the firm; information asymmetric might be smaller for one firm and 
greater for other firms. He et al., (2013) reported that business groups help to alleviate the asymmetric  
information as well as legal issues that appear while approaching external capital markets.  
     A firm’s optimal cash holding level is that when the marginal benefit is equal to marginal cost. A 
number of studies have focused on cash holdings in various forms such as determinants of cash 
holdings (Dalbor & Oak, 2011; Kim et al., 2011; Gao et al., 2013; Al-Najjar & Belghitar, 2011), effect of 
corporate governance on cash holdings (e.g. Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004; Ferreira & Vilela, 2004;  Chen & 
Chuang 2009; Drobetz & Gruninger, 2007; Huang, Elkinawy & Jain, 2013), adjustment of cash 
holdings toward target levels  (Opler et al., 1999; Venkiteshwaran, 2011), impact of cash holdings on 
firms’ market value (Pinkowitz et al., 2006; Martinez-Sola et al., 2013, Kalcheva & Lins, 2007). 
     Studies of cash holdings in Pakistan remains limited; mainly by (Afza and Adnan, 2007; Rizwan 
and Javed, 2011; Shabbir et al., 2016) examined the determinants of cash holdings. They found that  
reinvestment, dividend payment, precautionary motives and pecking order theory are key 
determinants of cash holdings in Pakistan. In different studies, looking at the impact of corporate 
governance measures on cash holdings, they found the managerial ownership is negative related to  
cash holdings. This implies that managerial ownership would decrease cash and helpful in avoiding 
agency problems (Masood, A., and Shah, A., 2014; Basheer, M. F., 2014; H. et al., 2014).   
     In business groups internal capital markets are considered as a key source to channelize the 
resources between affiliated firms, it enables the flow of cash from one affiliated firm to other affiliated 
firms. Transferring excess cash from member firm to another reduces dependency on external capital 
markets and benefits of holding cash. Internal capital markets are different from external capital 
markets due to transactions cost, control rights, assets specific ity, incentives and information (e.g.  
Gertner, Schafstein and Stein, 1994; Stein 1997). 
     Subramaniam et al., (2011) documents that diversified firms hold considerably lower cash as 
compare to focused firms. This is due to easy access to internal capital markets and better prospects 
for selling assets. W.Cai et al. (2016) suggested that precautionary objectives to hold cash are to 
respond unexpected future cash flow surprises. Business groups help affiliated firms’ to avoid the 
problem of uncertainty of future cash flows in different manners. First, groups allow the development  
of internal capital markets, to some extent internal markets help to replace the external markets to 
meet the financial needs of affiliated firms. Funds from group member are collected into a pool and 
then reallocated them to the most money-making projects. Essentially, business groups are providing 
a valuable forum for an efficient allocation of financial and managerial level resources among group 
member firms. Moreover, it is more beneficial when external markets are not developed. Khanna and 
Yafeh (2005) provided empirical facts that business groups help member firms in sharing their risks. 
On average, it is executed by transferring resources from profitable affiliates to non-profitable 
affiliates; this practice is common during times of financial difficulty.  Prowse (1992) already provided 
empirical evidence that group affiliated firms help member firms particularly those which are suffering 
due to financial problems; it is done for the survival of a group in the long run. Verschueren and 
Deloof (2006) provided an evidence that intra-group guarantees support member firms to meet 
financing needs by way of using corporate bonds and bank loans. 
     Ferreira and Vilela (2004) documents that development of capital markets has a negative effect on 
cash holdings. Denis & Sibilkov (2010) finds that cash value increases with increasing financial 
constraints. Locorotondo et al. (2014) reported a contradictory relationship of cash holdings and group 
affiliated firms based on a sample of Belgian firms. Pinkowitz et al. (2006) examined that Japanese 
business groups hold less cash than other firms.  
     Based on the literature, it is expected that group affiliation provides better access to financing 
requirements along with it enables to generate more constant future cash flows to avoid uncertainty. 
Resultantly, precautionary motives are weakening and group firms prefer to keep less cash. Together,  
relying on this intuition and presence of internal capital markets, it is proposed that group firms should 
hold significantly less cash as compare to standalone firms. Therefore, it is expec ted that negative 
association is present between cash holdings and group affiliation. 
H1. Business group member firms hold less cash than standalone firms. 
3        Data and Methodology 
3.1     Data 
     This study sample is based on the public limited firms listed at Pakistan Stock Exchange during 
2009-2014. A sample of study includes 34 business groups, 132 firms are group affiliated and 111 
standalone firms have been selected. In total 243 firms including group affiliated and standalone firms 
have been selected to study cash holding behavior of firms. The sample includes only those firms 
which are owned purely by Pakistani nationals. Firms with dual ownership are excluded from the 
sample. Only manufacturing firms are part of the sample. Financial services firms are excluded from 
this sample since their accounting scheme is not compatible with that of firms in other industries.  
     A firm’s group affiliation is identified by using the book of Rehman (1998), who reported the list and 
details of business groups and their affiliated firms in Pakistan’s economy. This book is a primary  
source to separate the affiliated firms from standalone firms. Moreover, group membership is also 
confirmed by following He et al. (2013) that group affiliation in each year is based on whether its 
controller has also more than one listed firm in a same year. Data of business group’s affiliation and 
standalone firms has been collected manually from the annual reports of listed firms. The data is also 
collected from Financial Statement Analysis of Non-Financial Sector; this data is administered and 
published by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), the Central Bank of Pakistan. Moreover, this data is 
comparable to the annual reports submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan 
(SECP). Firms in Pakistan have to report their data to the SECP annually; hence transparency and 
accuracy of data are needed as per law. 
     Table 1 summarizes the sample selection process and industries based on the classification of 
SECP. The sample of study is 243 firms, 132 of which are affiliated with the business group and 111 
are standalone firms. The total numbers of observations in this study are 1458. A textile industry 
comprised the major share with 570 observations, 312 of which are affiliated with business groups. 
There is no group affiliated firm from Information, Communication & Transport industry. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
     The study explores the relationship between cash holdings and business group membership 
based on the framework applied by W.Cai et al. (2016), one main characteristic i.e. group affiliation is  
used to test the issue related to cash holdings. This study used panel data analysis technique and 
pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression method to estimate group membership and cash 
holdings for public limited firms for 2009-2014. A model can be described by the following equation: 
 
CASH i,  = βo + β1GROUP i, +  β2LEV i,  +  β3CF i,  +  β4 LIQ i,  +  β5DIV i,  +  β6SIZE i, +  i,        
     The dependent variable CASH is referred to cash holdings, the independent variables - GROUP  
refers to dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm is affiliated with group and 0 for standalone firm; LEV 
refers to total debt divided by total assets ; CF refers to operating cash flows; LIQ refers to working 
capital minus cash and cash equivalents divide by total assets; DIV is the ratio of net operating profit  
minus tax provision divided by total amount of dividend;  SIZE is measured by  natural logarithm of 
total assets. If H1is supported and group affiliated firms hold less cash than standalone firms, and 
then it should be observed that β1 is significantly negative. 
Table 1. Sample Selection and Industry Distribution 
 
Industry            Total  Group affiliated sample        Stand-alone sample 
              (Group = 1)        (Group = 0) 
 
Textile    95   52    43  
Chemicals &    27   12    15 
      Pharmaceuticals          
Cement                13                       9    4  
Fuel & Energy   12   10    2 
Motor Vehicles                16   13    3 
       & Auto parts                 
Sugar    20    7    13 
Coke & Refined   5    5    0 
        Petroleum Products         
Manufacturing                20    6    14 
Paper, Paperboard   8    5    3 
         & Products       
Food    11    6    5 
Mineral Products  7    3    4 
Other Services                3                3    0 
         Activities     
Electrical Machinery        4        1    3 
Information       2    0    2 
        Comm. & Transport         
 
Total               243  132               111 
Table 2. Variables definitions. 
 
Variables   Acronym Definition 
 
Cash Holdings                (CASH) Cash and cash equivalents/(total assets minus cash & cash 
equivalents) 
Business Group              (GROUP) Dummy variable - one for group member firms and zero for 
standalone firms. 
Leverage   (LEV)   Total debt divided by total assets 
Cash flow   (CASHFLOW)  Operating cash flow divided by total assets 
Liquid substitutes  (LIQ)  Working capital minus cash & cash equivalents divided by 
total        assets 
Dividend                         (DIV)  Net operating profit minus tax provision divided by total 
amount of dividend 
Firm size   (SIZE)   Natural logarithm of total assets 
 
 
4. Empirical Findings 
 
4.1 Correlation Matrix  
 
     Table 3 presents the results of the correlation. Since, group affiliation is negatively correlated with 
cash, indicating that member firms prefer to hold less cash as compare to standalone firms. This  
relationship is consistent with H1. CASH is negatively correlated with leverage, dividend, and size, 
and positively correlated with cash flow and liquidity. This shows that control variables are key  
determinants of firm’s cash policy. Overall, most of the independent variables are weakly correlated 
with each other.  Moreover, the values of variance inflation factors (VIF) of the explanatory variables  
are less than 2.  Rogerson (2001) recommended a maximum value of VIF is 5. In this study, overall 
main variables mean value of VIF is 1.11 i.e. less than maximum recommended value of 5. 
4.2. Descriptive statistics 
     Table 4 showing the results of descriptive statistics for both affiliated (Panel A) and unaffiliated 
(Panel B) firms. The average cash ratios of affiliated and unaffiliated samples are 0.058 and 0.295,  
respectively.  Another key observation is affiliated firms keep less cash on their balance sheets than 
standalone firms; this can be seen at mean levels. This is the first support to H1. On average,  
member firms have higher levels of leverage, cash flow, size and dividend payments. 
 
Table 3: Correlation matrix for main variables. Table 2 presents description and acronyms for each 
variable.  
         CASH          GROUP      LEV      CASH FLOW      LIQ           DIV          SIZE 
 
CASH   1.000          
 
GROUP  -0.0955         1.000      
 
LEV   -0.5295         0.0002       1.000 
 
CASHFLOW   0.0466         0.0523        0.0140        1.000        
 
LIQ    0.0379         0.0796       -0.3586         0.0765       1.0000       
 
DIV   -0.0983         0.1117        0.0357         0.0572        0.0627       1.0000 
 
SIZE   -0.0549       0.3062      -0.0840         0.0543     0.2104         0.0527        1.0000 
 
4.3  Group affiliation and cash holdings 
     In this part, by using Pooled OLS regression, it is examined whether group affiliated firms hold 
significantly less cash or not. Table 5 presents results of regression with dependent variable cash and 
group affiliation as the independent variable.  
     Regression in Table 5 quantifies the impact of group membership on cash holdings including 
control variables as well as a dummy variable for group affiliation, which is one for group membership 
and zero for standalone firms. Table 5 includes t-statistics, R-square (R2) and F-significance value. It 
is observed that R2 value is = 0.3249 or 32.49%, that explains the variation in cash holdings i.e. a 
dependent variable in this study. The R2 is a coefficient of determination; it measures the variation of 
a dependent variable due to independent variables. Thus, group affiliation, leverage, cash flow, size, 
dividend, and liquidity are used as independent variables; together they have 32.49% impact on cash 
holding pattern of group affiliated firms. The F-significance value measures the overall fitness of 
model whether the model is statistically significant or not? The F-significance value is 116. 39 
(p<0.0000); it shows the overall fitness of model. This confirms the fitness of model used in this study. 
     As reported in the table the impact of GROUP on cash holdings is statistically significant and 
negative (-.158, t-stat. = -2.80). In economic term, a one-standard-deviation increase in the likelihood 
of being group affiliated expects a roughly 15% decrease in the cash ratio. 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for main variables. Table 2 presents description and acronyms for each variable.  
 
Period     Obs.     CASH             LEV     CASH FLOW        LIQ    DIV                    SIZE   
       ______________      ______________     ____________         ______________   ______________                 _______________  
      Mean    Std. Dev     Mean   Std. Dev       Mean    Std. Dev    Mean    Std. Dev     Mean   Std. Dev              Mean     Std. Dev 
Panel A. Group Affiliated Sample (Group = 1) 
2009    132    .059    .151         .648      .430          .080      .137         -.021       .379          2.265      6.894           14.677       2.729    
2010       132      .072     .187          .632      .481          .085      .133         -.013       .450          4.203      10.452         14.739       2.756 
2011       132      .050     .133         .651       .546          .030      .094         -.003       .524          5.374      15.965         15.245       1.599 
2012       132      .051     .141         .646       .695          .082      .112          -.003      .681          2.787        5.667         15.291       1.651 
2013       132      .063     .197         .615       .722          .072      .128          .024       .698          4.803      13.967         15.365       1.610 
2014       132      .056     .287         .602       .696          .062      .096          .012       .708          3.164        7.322         15.453       1.636 
Avg.    132    .058     .183         .632        .595         .068      .117         -.001       .573          3.766       10.044        15.128       2.000 
Panel B. Group Affiliated Sample (Group = 0) 
2009    111      .297      1.803      .681       1.679       .065       .105        -.045       .418         -3.329       48.003         13.585       2.069   
2010       111      .289      1.808      .608       2.111       .063       .114        -.034       .444          1.350         4.631          13.655      2.102 
2011       111      .314      1.814      .657       1.485       .050       .126        -.059       .445            .999         4.243          13.899      1.676 
2012       111      .285      1.824      .710       1.708       .058       .157        -.100       .562            .562         2.974          13.953      1.707 
2013       111      .290      1.822      .650       2.707       .057       .118        -.153       .749          1.106         4.367          13.981      1.716 
2014       111      .294      1.856      .482       4.552       .041       .112        -.196       .972            .764         3.347          14.045      1.727 
Avg.        111      .295      1.821      .631       2.374       .056       .122        -.098      .598             .242        11.261         13.853      1.833 
Panel C.  Full Sample (Group and Standalone firms). 
2009    243       .168      1.226       .663      1.175      .073       .123         -.032      .406           -.289         32.877       14.179       2.505 
2010       243       .175      1.232       .621      1.467      .075       .125         -.023       .447          2.900          8.421        14.243      2.532 
2011       243       .170      1.234       .653      1.079      .039       .110         -.029       .489          3.375        12.285        14.630      1.764 
2012       243       .158      1.239       .675      1.260      .071       .134         -.047       .630          1.771          4.758        14.680      1.801 
2013       243       .167      1.242       .631      1.900      .065       .124         -.056       .726          3.114        10.847        14.733      1.794 
2014       243       .165      1.274       .547      3.112      .053       .104         -.083       .844          2.068          5.962        14.810      1.816  
Avg.       243        .167      1.241       .632      1.666      .063       .120         -.045       .590          2.157        12.525        14.546      2.035   
Table 5: Results estimation, effect of group affiliation on cash holdings. The t-statistics are in 




                                               Full Sample 
 
Dependent Variable:   CASH 
 
GROUP         -.158** 
                   (-2.80) 
 
LEV          -.405*** 
                   (-25.45) 
 
CASH FLOW         0.784*** 
                      (3.54) 
 
LIQ          -.323*** 
                       (-6.74) 
 
DIV           -.004** 
            (-2.83) 
 
SIZE           -.031** 
                      (-2.26) 
 
Intercept          0.909*** 
           4.630 
 
Obs.              243 
 
R2           0.3249   
 
Adj.R2             0.3221 
 
F-Value                       116.39 
Note:  ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level.  
     This suggests a decreasing demand for cash from group affiliated firms, consistent with the 
hypothesis. Therefore, the results confirm that impact of group affiliation is together statistically and 
economically significant. Group member firms prefer to keep essentially less cash as compare to 
standalone firms even after controlling well-determined control variables such as leverage, liquidity, cash 
flow, dividend, and size. Furthermore, a finding is consistent with the view that existences of internal 
capital markets and due to lower financial constraints group member firms favor holding less cash 
(Schiantarelli and Sembenelli, 2000). 
     All of the control variables significantly explain firms’ cash levels. As reported, the coefficient of 
leverage (LEV) is statistically significant and negative (-.405, t-stat = -25.45), which is consistent with 
earlier studies (Afza & Adnan, 2007; Bates et al. , 2009). The result of this study shows more levered firms 
carry considerably a smaller amount of cash. The coefficient of cash flows (CASH FLOW) is statistically 
significant and positive (0.784, t-stat = 3.54), which is in line with previous studies (Al-Najjar & Belghitar, 
2011; Afza & Adnan, 2007). According to the view of Myers and Majluf (1984), firms with higher level of 
cash flows carry more cash. Firms with more cash flow variations prefer to hold extra cash to avoid the 
risk of cash flow. The presence of more liquid assets on balance sheet other than cash also impact the 
cash holding pattern of group affiliated firms; because non-cash liquidity substitutes are considered as an 
alternative to cash. Conversion cost of other liquid assets into cash is comparatively low to other assets, 
as a result in presence of more liquid assets firms prefers to hold less cash reserves. Non-cash liquid 
substitute (LIQ) has a negative influence on cash holdings; estimated coefficient is statistically significant. 
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) provided empirical evidence that if a firm has a problem of cash shortage; liquid  
assets used as a substitute for cash. Using internal favorable transactions, group member firms can 
easily liquidate their non-cash liquid substitutes. Consistent with other studies (e.g. Al-Najjar and 
Belghitar, 2011; and Ullah, Rehman, Saeed, and Zeb, 2014) the coefficient of dividend ( DIV) is negative 
and statistically significant. Dividend paying group member firms hold less cash as compare to 
standalone firms. Firm Size (SIZE) is another key determinant of cash holdings; consistent with (Bates, 
Khale, & Stulz, 2009; Mulligan, 1997) because of economies of scale firms hold less cash.  Size 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant. 
 
5. Conclusion 
     This study investigates the effect of business group affiliation on cash holdings of member firms. Using 
data of Pakistani public limited firms listed at Pakistan Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2014, the results 
show that group member firms prefer to hold less cash comparable to standalone firms. The findings of 
the study show that group affiliation, leverage, liquidity, dividend and size have negative significant impact 
on cash holdings. Several reasons for weakening in the demand for cash of group affiliated firms as 
compare to standalone firms (i) existence of internal capital markets (ii) having a bank in the group 
supports better access to funds and provision of guarantees (iii) group diversification favors lower cash 
balances.  Further studies can be conducted by comparing the dynamics of cash holdings of group 
affiliated firms between developing and developed economies; this may also yield new insights.   
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